








The banking structure that India inherited at Independence in 1947 suffered from 
two major drawbacks: (i) interlocking of directorship of industry houses and banks, and (ii) 
paucity of credit to socially and economically important sectors of the economy. The 
numerous problems arising in the wake of these drawbacks provided the economic rationale 
for the momentous decision to nationalize 14 private banks in 1969, as well as for the 
subsequent nationalization of six more banks in 1980. The post-nationalization phase was 
characterized by a strategy of massive expansion of the banking network coupled with 
stipulations on sectoral lending. Even today, when the euphoria over nationalization has 
given way to considerable skepticism, it cannot be denied that the liberal branch licensing 
norms coupled with a system of directed credit stipulations, made a significant dent on rural 
and (to some extent) urban poverty and mitigated the dependence of the socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups on the indigenous money lenders. Additionally many 
would agree that the system did contribute to rapid growth by providing timely and 
concessional credit to several industrial sectors.  
However, the strict regulation over banks’ lending, combined  with extensive 
regulation of interest rates across the entire maturity spectrum, also paved the way for the 
banking sector to be increasingly cast in the role of ‘handmaiden’ to government policies.  
The high CRRs (cash reserve ratios) and SLRs (statutory liquidity ratios), though ostensibly 
serving the purposes of credit regulation, financial stability and inflation control, adversely 
impacted the profitability banks and represented a substantial (about 63.5%) pre-emption of 
bank resources. Additionally, the administered interest structure, assumed over time, an 
extremely complex character, with rates being distinguished according to bank size, 
maturity profile and economic conditions, which permitted only a limited role for market 
forces in the pricing and allocation of credit. It was inevitable that such a highly regulated 
banking system should get riddled with administrative  inefficiencies and red-tape. The 
constellation of economic features resulting from these developments is usually subsumed 
under the rubric of “financial repression”.  
A process of liberalization of the economy was initiated in India in 1991-92, which 
aimed at raising the allocative efficiency of available savings, improving  the return on 
investments and promoting accelerated and equitable growth of the real sector. Towards this 
end, a multi-pronged reform strategy  was  initiated encompassing all areas of economic 
activity. In the financial sector specifically, the thrust of the reforms was to promote a 
diversified, efficient and competitive financial system. While these reforms were underway, 
the world economy also witnessed significant changes, coinciding with the movement 
towards global integration of financial services.  
Before turning to an appraisal of banking reforms in India, it may be helpful to have 
a helicopter overview of the Indian banking sector. Conventionally, the sector is classified 
into two broad categories:  commercial banks and co-operative banks. The various sub-
components of these two categories, together with two broad indicators of their relative 
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significance (viz., number of institutions and asset size), are presented in Table 1.
4 The 
exclusive focus of this article is  on the commercial banking system which currently 
accounts for over 85% of the assets of the banking sector.   
 
Table 1: Structure of the Indian Banking System:  
Number of Institutions and Aggregate Assets 
(As on March 2004) 




Per cent to 
total asset
Banking Sector  (1 + 2)   23,473  100.0
1. Commercial banks ( a + b)  291 20,459  87.2
       (a)  Scheduled commercial banks 286 20,457 87.2
                 Public sector banks  27 14,714  62.7
                 Private sector banks  30 3,672  15.6
                 Foreign banks  33 1,363  5.8
                 Regional rural banks  196 707  3.0
      (b) Non-scheduled commercial banks  4 2  0.01
  
2. Cooperative banks  ( a + b)  3,111 3,015  12.8
        (a) Rural cooperative banks  1,185 1,790  7.6
        (b) Urban cooperative banks  1,926 1,226  5.2
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
II. Banking  Reforms:  Some General considerations 
The first phase of financial sector reforms in India were guided by the 
recommendations of the Committee on the Financial System (Chairman: Mr. M. 
Narasimham). Several features of the reform process deserve mention. First, financial sector 
reforms were undertaken early in the economic reform cycle. Secondly, reform in the 
financial sector were initiated through own initiatives in a well-structured, sequenced and 
phased manner and not induced by a crisis, although the balance-of-payments problems in 
1991 did provide the wake-up call. Third, a consultative approach towards policy 
formulation was adopted, which not only enabled benchmarking the financial services 
against international best standards in a transparent manner, but also provided useful lead-
time to market players for smooth adjustment to regulatory changes. Importantly, unlike the 
‘stop-go’ approach adopted in several Latin American and Asian economies, the Indian 
approach to financial sector reforms has been marked by ‘gradualism’ so as to ensure a 
gradual, non-disruptive and transparent approach to the process (Ahluwalia, 2002).  
It seems useful to classify the liberalization process of Indian banking as the 
confluence of three distinct but mutually reinforcing sets of factors: (a) liberalization 
imperatives, (b) stimulus arising by domestic forces, and (c) stimulus from external forces. 
This compartmentalization is, however, not watertight and more often than not, might 
reflect overlapping considerations. The details of banking reforms are India is in Box I. 
 
Box I: Banking Reforms in India 
Liberalization Imperatives 
•  Sharp reduction in CRR and SLR. 
•  Dismantling of administered interest rates with a few exceptions.  
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•  Market-determined pricing for government securities. 
•  Measures to strengthen risk management through recognition of different 
components of risk, assignment of risk-weights to various asset classes, norms on 
connected lending, risk concentration, application of marked-to-market principle for 
investment portfolio and limits on deployment of fund in sensitive activities. 
 
Stimulus from Domestic Forces 
•  Granting of operational autonomy and  broad-basing ownership in public sector 
banks by allowing them to raise capital up to 49 % of equity.  
•  Enhanced transparency and disclosure norms to facilitate market discipline.  
 
Stimulus from External Forces 
•  Introduction of  norms on risk-based  capital standards, accounting, income 
recognition, asset classification, provisioning and exposure norms. 
•  Transparent norms for entry of new  private sector, liberalized entry for  foreign 
banks and insurance companies, permission for foreign investment through foreign 
direct Investment / portfolio investment, permission to banks to diversify product 
portfolio and business activities. 
•  Settling up of Lok Adalats (people’s courts), debt recovery tribunals, asset 
reconstruction companies, settlement advisory committees, corporate debt 
restructuring mechanism, etc. for quicker recovery/ restructuring. Promulgation of 
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities 
Interest (SARFAESI), Act and its subsequent amendment to ensure creditor rights.  
•  Strengthening corporate governance, enhanced ‘due diligence’ on important 
shareholders, ‘fit and proper’ tests for directors. 
•  Institution of Credit Information Bureau for information sharing on defaulters as 
also other borrowers. 
•  Establishment of Clearing Corporation of India Limited to act as central counter 
party for facilitating payments and settlement system relating to fixed income 
securities and money market instruments. 
•  Setting up of INFINET as the communication backbone for the financial sector, 
introduction of Negotiated Dealing System for screen-based trading in government 
securities and Real Time Gross Settlement System. 
 
 
The net impact of these policy changes is gradually getting reflected in the financial 
performance of banks. That banks have been able to cope successfully with the new 
liberalized environment is evident from the marked improvement in their standard 
performance indicators, reflected in Table 2. 4   
Table 2: Performance Indicators of Indian Commercial Banks 
                                                                                                      (As % of Total Asset) 
Bank Group  1980-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Operating expense  2.53 2.74 2.64 2.19 2.24 2.20
Spread 1.90 2.94 2.87 2.57 2.77 2.86
Net Profit  0.15 -0.16 0.61 0.75 1.01 1.13
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
 
Spurred by the gradual tightening of prudential norms over the years (reflecting an 
increasing convergence towards international best practices as detailed in Basel II), there 
has been considerable improvement in two other traditional areas of concern.  The overall 
capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks, which was 10.40% in 1996-97 has since 
trended upwards to reach 12.9% in 2003-04. Likewise, improved recovery management and 
better risk assessment, has resulted in a steady decline in the non-performing loans of banks, 
which, as a percentage of total loans, have halved over the last decade from 15.7% to 7.8%. 
 
III.   Emerging Issues 
Crystal ball gazers of the economy would have no difficulty in foreseeing that the 
Indian banking industry is poised for fundamental structural transformation in the coming 
years. The reasons for such a prognostication are manifold but could be condensed to four 
basic set of factors: (1) liberalization of trade in financial services under WTO auspices, (2) 
autonomous diffusion of  information technology, (3) international harmonization of 
financial standards involving improved levels of transparency and disclosure standards, and 
(4) greater emphasis on governance through shareholder value creation.  These four basic 
factors, acting singly and in combination are the major drivers of the various changes that 
are being envisaged for the Indian banking sector in the future. We briefly survey some of 
these emerging issues.  
 
 Consolidation  
  The liberalization under way has as yet not impinged significantly on the structure 
of the Indian banking system.  The consolidation process witnessed within the industry in 
recent years has primarily been confined to a few mergers in the private sector, and often a 
response to localized bank failures. However the rapid growth in global trade and 
investment flows has opened up avenues for cross-border financing of economic activities, 
propelling the inducement for cross-border mergers of banks, to avail of mutual location and 
business-specific complementarities. Technology developments have facilitated the 
integration of global transactions and in the process introduced substantial economies of 
scale. Recognizing the imperatives of consolidation, efforts have been initiated by the 
Government and the RBI to iron out the various legal impediments inherent in the process.  
 
Competition and FDI in the Banking Sector 
 The post-liberalisation phase has also seen the emergence of newer competitive 
forces in the largely public sector dominated Indian banking scenario. So far these forces 
have been confined to a highly modernized and efficient domestic private banking, but in 
the wake of the WTO commitment foreign banks are very likely to exhibit a dramatic 
growth in their presence in India (going by the experience of other emerging market 5   
economies, which had relaxed restrictions on foreign banking presence in the early 1990s). 
The WTO commitments would terminate most of these restrictions in a phased manner.  
A related issue bears on the rules governing FDI in Indian banks, which have also 
been considerably liberalized in the last few years. Until recently, minority foreign 
participation by foreign banking companies as technical collaborators or co-promoters, 
through the FIPB route in private sector Indian banks was restricted to 20 %. The limit was 
raised to 49 % in May 2001 (and subsequently to 74 % in 2004). Foreign banks having 
branch presence in India are also made eligible for FDI in private sector banks subject to an 
overall cap of 49 %. One of the major demands of foreign investors has been the removal of 
the 10% cap on their voting rights in the management of banks and available indications 
point to the amendment of this limitation in the near future.  
Several concerns, however attend the issue of liberalization of the entry norms for 
foreign banks (and FDI in the banking sector). First, in view of the well-known tendency of 
foreign banks to “cherry-pick” the loans market, a large foreign presence could leave 
domestic banks saddled with less creditworthy customers, increasing the overall risk of 
domestic bank portfolios. Secondly, the supervision of the more sophisticated activities of 
foreign banks and monitoring of the new products usually introduced by them entails a 
continuous challenge for regulatory authorities to monitor these banks’ activities on a 
consolidated basis. Another important supervisory issue is whether depositors in foreign 
banks would be entitled to receive the same degree of protection as depositors in domestic 
banks and whether the central bank of the host country should extend the ‘lender of last 
resort’ umbrella to foreign banks facing illiquidity crises. There is also the possible threat of 
excessive concentration, since foreign subsidiaries backed by their parent corporations 
(often ‘banking behemoths’) could exert substantive market power and extract higher 
interest margins in the domestic market. Finally, it should be highlighted that the admission 




 Credit Delivery 
  In recent years, it is being increasingly recognized that large segments of the rural 
population face ‘financial exclusion’ from the formal banking sector, and continue their 
traditional dependence on the informal sector. Two areas in particular have been of concern 
to policy makers: priority sector lending and timely flow of credit to the needy and 
deserving.  
  As regards the first, the definition of priority sector has been gradually enlarged, 
interest rates on priority sector lending left to market forces (except for a cap on small loans) 
and alternate avenues of investment permitted, thus making the priority lending far more 
flexible than before, in line with the major recommendations of the Advisory Committee on 
Flow of Credit to Agriculture and Related Activities from the Banking System (Chairman: 
Mr. V. S. Vyas) 
  As regards the issue of credit delivery, the ‘lending inertia’ on the part of a mid-
sized commercial bank has been well documented in an influential study (Banerjee et al., 
2005).  In recognition of this fact, recent policies have placed explicit emphasis on 
streamlining credit delivery through a gamut of measures, including, inter alia, (i) widening 
the scope of infrastructure lending, (ii) revamping the rural credit delivery system by 
envisaged restructuring of the rural banking segment (iii) widening the scope of priority 
sector lending, (iv) introduction of innovative instruments on the lines of Kisan Credit Cards 
buttressed with various value-added features and (v) according all possible encouragement 
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for forging appropriate public-private partnerships (e.g., Self Help Groups) in the field of 
micro-finance activities.  
  
Corporate Governance 
The issue of corporate governance has come to the fore in the current liberalized 
environment where banks are expected to function as commercial entities with explicit 
emphasis on shareholder value creation. The commercial character of banks is getting 
increasing emphasis with more and more banks getting listed on the stock exchange, and the 
proposed lowering of government stock holdings in banks to a minimum of 33% (first 
envisaged in the Union Budget 2000-01) would reinforce this character apart from providing 
bank boards with greater flexibility. The quality of corporate governance in banks in the 
emerging scenario, would be crucially guided by their ability to find suitable qualified and 
independent professionals to serve on their boards. 
 
Risk Management  
In the highly regulated and protected financial system of the pre-reform era, risk 
management was a secondary issue for the public sector dominated banking system. The 
picture has changed drastically with the deregulation and liberalization of the financial 
system.  
 So far as ‘credit risk’ is concerned, the envisaged introduction of ‘core banking’ 
solutions would enable banks to segregate the credit sourcing (front office) and appraisal 
(back office) functions, which can, over time, build up expertise and monitor credit 
migrations on a bank-wide basis, a key factor behind the application of the Basel II 
approach (Nachane et al, 2005). The use of dynamic credit scoring models coupled with the 
full-fledged operationalization of the credit bureau would enable banks to switch from 
traditional proprietary models to newer methods of credit evaluation to reflect the repayment 
and recovery experience across a spectrum of asset classes and spatial locations.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The Indian financial system has exhibited a fair degree of resilience in responding 
to structural adjustments; nevertheless, a marked tendency towards slippages has also been 
evident with even slight relaxations of the regulatory leash.  An ‘bang-bang’ approach to 
financial sector liberalization, in spite of being advocated by influential sections of domestic 
and global opinion could well prove counter-productive and impose irreversible costs on the 
Indian system. As in other areas of reforms, ‘gradualism’ seems to be the ideal prescription.  
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